Introduction
This study investigates restatements of annual financial reports issued by U. S. Enron (Greenblatt 2005) .
We focus on two aspects of municipal restatements. First, we investigate the consequences of restatements in the market for municipal debt. Second, we consider whether and how these consequences depend on two potentially important municipal governance characteristics: audit and voter oversight.
With respect to the first issue, evidence from the corporate sector suggests that restatements influence financing costs adversely (Abbott et al. 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Srinivasan 2005) , although the severity depends in part on whether the restatement indicates a material irregularity (Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008) . The question of whether restatements are significant events in the context of municipal debt markets is an open issue, however. Potential lenders may construe restatements as evidence that local government managers mismanage or manipulate financial information to advance a political agenda. For example, Moody's cited concerns about financial management when twice downgrading San Diego's bonds following its restatement disclosure (Moody's, 2004a (Moody's, , 2004b . On the other hand, the importance of financial reporting -and by extension, financial restatements -in the governmental setting is debatable (Zimmerman 1977) . If municipal restatements reflect insignificant or unimportant reporting errors, rather than evidence of financial mismanagement or manipulation, then lenders may be indifferent to restatement disclosures. In the end, the consequence of restatements in municipal debt markets is a matter to be resolved empirically.
With respect to the second issue --audit and voter oversight as a determinant of restatement consequences --we are guided by a large body of research in the corporate setting which investigates associations between accounting restatements and corporate governance characteristics. Important differences between corporate and government enterprise discourage straightforward extrapolation of results from one context to another, and therefore, the extent that audit and voter oversight influences contracting between lenders and municipalities, also remains an open issue.
A distinguishing feature of the investigation is that we consider the importance of the municipal governance system as a whole, rather than individual municipal
characteristics. An important innovation in this regard is that we construct indices designed to capture cross-sectional differences in the intensity and efficacy of audit and voter oversight in the municipal context. To validate our approach, we investigate the relative importance of municipal governance characteristics as determinants of municipal restatements. Multivariate specifications indicate that the collective explanatory power of audit and voter oversight measures for these data substantially exceeds that of size, financial condition, debt financing, regulatory oversight, and organizational form measures used frequently in studies of reporting quality.
We then turn to the central objective of the study, which is to investigate the debt cost consequences of restatements and whether these consequences are affected by municipal governance characteristics. Our analysis indicates that municipal debt interest costs for new issues are substantially higher following restatement disclosures.
Specifications of debt costs that consider restatements and governance characteristics interactively suggest that adverse consequences of restatements are, to an extent, mitigated by strong audit oversight and provisions that encourage direct voter participation in the governance process.
The specific contribution of the study is straightforward, as no prior study considers the adverse consequences of financial reporting quality in the municipal government context. Moreover, we consider municipal governance beyond what is in the literature currently.
The study also has more general implications for understanding financial reporting quality. In particular, aspects of the municipal sector differ from the corporate setting in ways that provide unique opportunities to examine the relation among governance attributes, restatements, and debt markets with new perspective and, in some cases, with greater statistical power. As examples, prior studies of the bond market consequences of restatements in the corporate sector are limited owing to a lack of data, and studies of the auditors' role with respect to restatements are restricted because the characteristics of audit firms lack sufficient variation in the corporate setting. In contrast, the availability of municipal bond data and the high degree of variation in the size and quality of municipal auditors facilitate statistical tests with greater power. The municipal sector also provides a richer context to investigate the role of outsider (voter-taxpayer) participation in the governance process. In particular, because transactions costs to voters of investing in municipalities are greater than to shareholders in capital markets, the incentive for direct participation in the governance process by outsiders is more conspicuous in the municipal context than in the corporate sector, where the exit option more effectively imposes discipline through market prices (Zimmerman 1977) .
The remainder of the presentation is organized as follows. Features of municipal governance systems are described, and hypotheses regarding the consequences of financial restatements are developed, in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and measures used in the study. Cross-sectional associations between restatements and audit and voter characteristics reported in Section 4 validate the oversight indices used in the primary investigation reported in Section 5. In particular, multivariate specifications described in section 5 consider the consequences of restatements in municipal debt markets and whether these consequences are influenced by audit and voter oversight characteristics. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
Municipal governance systems and hypotheses
Consistent with the standard agency characterization (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983) , we view municipal officials as agents who act on behalf of voters, lenders, or other participants in the municipal enterprise. This characterization is well-developed in the for-profit context, and thus, it is instructive to compare the incentives of voters/taxpayers who finance municipalities with the incentives of shareholders who finance commercial enterprise. In particular, transaction costs in political markets -that is, the costs of locating to a new municipality, including the direct cost of real estate transactions -are high relative to transaction costs in capital markets (Zimmerman 1977) . For this reason, voters/taxpayers, who cannot easily dispose of investments in the municipal enterprise, are less able to price-protect themselves from opportunistic behavior by governmental agents. More specifically, voters/taxpayers who finance municipalities and consume municipal services find it costly to avoid taxes or discipline elected officials by disinvesting, i.e., by selling their real estate investments.
These high transaction costs potentially elevate the importance of direct forms of oversight to protect voter/taxpayer investments relative to the use of exit to discipline municipal officials.
Given this distinguishing feature of governments, we characterize municipal governance as a portfolio of institutionalized procedures, practices, and mechanisms that provide monitoring and oversight and constrain actions in ways that align incentives of municipal officials with those of voters. To keep the analysis tractable, we restrict the investigation to two forms of municipal governance, which we designate audit oversight and voter oversight. These governance forms are developed below, but it is important to note that our treatment of governance mechanisms is neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. We are specifically interested in aspects of municipal governance that potentially influence the quality and reliability of municipal financial reporting. Thus, the objective is to achieve a framework that is sufficiently rich for considering interactions among governance alternatives as they relate to municipal financial reporting quality. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) using restatements, and Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) using SEC enforcement actions, fail to find associations between financial reporting quality and the use of a Big Four auditor. To our knowledge, no prior study explores the role of audit committees in municipal financial reporting quality.
Audit oversight and municipal reporting quality
In addition to the foregoing classification, we consider external auditor turnover. 
Voter oversight and municipal reporting quality
We consider voter oversight in terms of the extent that voters participate in the municipal governance process. To develop a link between voter participation and municipal financial reporting, we presume that elected officials and their potential competitors require the support of individuals who provide the votes and other resources necessary to be elected (Laver 1981) . The need to attract such support creates incentives 2 Evidence in the corporate context is that firms with SEC enforcement actions or restatements are less likely to have audit committees (DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Dechow et al. 1996; Beasley 1996) .
to implement and promote policies -including financial reporting policies -that benefit supporting interests (Baber 1990 ).
Consistent with Baber and Sen (1984) , we presume that the efficacy of voter oversight depends in part on political competition, defined in terms of the probability that incumbents are replaced. Although municipal elections take place at both the mayoral and council levels, following Evans and Patton (1987) (Bebchuk et al. 2002) and, as such, significantly insulate management from market discipline (Faleye 2007 These four provisions -initiative, referendum, recall, and staggered councils, each available in some, but not all, U.S. municipalities -facilitate direct voter participation in the municipal governance process.
Determinants of municipal restatements
To consider municipal financial reporting quality, we identify and distinguish municipalities that restate their financial statements. Financial accounting restatements are a well-researched topic in the corporate sector (Abbott et al. 2004; Palmrose et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Srinivasan 2005; Baber et al. 2009) . Following these studies, we characterize restatements as corrections of accounting misstatements made previously by negligent or, in the extreme, opportunistic managers. We presume further that substandard governance is at least partially responsible for financial reporting errors that manifest ultimately as accounting restatements. Given this context, investigating the extent that municipal governance characteristics correlate with accounting restatements informs thinking about the effectiveness of municipal governance as a determinant of financial reporting quality.
To this end, we specify the probability of restatement as We use expression (1) to consider each category of oversight procedures both separately, and jointly.
Consequences of restatements
We consider the consequences of restatements in the context of municipal debt costs. More specifically, we estimate specifications of true interest cost (TIC), computed as the discount rate that equates the present value of debt service with proceeds of the issue, for municipal debt issues for a sample of municipalities that disclose financial reporting restatements between 2001 and 2004.
Prior literature finds corporate restatements are associated with negative stock price reactions (Palmrose et al. 2004) , increases in the cost of equity capital (Hribar and Jenkins 2004) , and higher debt costs (Graham et al. 2008 Hypothesis 2: The consequences of municipal restatements are independent of audit and voter oversight.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are considered using specifications of the following general form.
where POST-RESTATEMENT is a dummy variable that distinguishes municipal debt issues after (POST-RESTATEMENT = 1) from issues before (POST-RESTATEMENT = 0) the restatement disclosure, and GOVERNANCE is a set of municipal characteristics that consider audit and voter oversight. Control variables indicate determinants of TIC documented in prior literature (e. g., Baber and Gore 2008) .
Negative estimates on the main effect POST-RESTATEMENT suggest adverse consequences to restatement disclosures. Estimates on the interactions POST-RESTATEMENT * GOVERNANCE indicate the extent that municipal governance characteristics mitigate or exacerbate the consequences of financial restatements on municipal debt costs.
3.
Sample and data
Sample selection
[ et al. 1995) , and to ensure data availability, we identify 365 of these municipalities with population greater than 50,000.
For 253 (69.3%) municipalities, we obtain through either an online search or a mail provisions equal to one if the municipality has neither initiative nor referendum provisions, and both provisions equal to one if the municipality has both of the provisions.
Municipalities with either, but not both, provisions have both indicator variables set to zero. Recall is an indicator variable set to one in municipalities where citizens attempt to recall either the mayor or a council member in the preceding five years.
We also construct a combined measure of voter oversight computed as the 6 Signs for indicator variables used to construct the audit and voter oversight indices are verified by specifications of restatement probabilities reported later in Table 3 . In particular, negative (positive) parameter estimates in Table 3 indicate lower restatement probability and therefore greater (lower) financial reporting quality. Thus, variables with negative (positive) estimates in Table 3 are +1 (-1) when computing the audit and voter oversight indices. Factor analysis is not employed because the governance measures are indicator variables, and some are categorical by construction (e.g. auditor type). Factor analysis is primarily designed for continuous variables; the use of categorical variables introduces negative spurious correlation which renders factors inferior to indices used in this study (Kolenikov and Angeles 2004) .
Control variables
We control for state municipal accounting requirements, the city manager form of government, municipal size, debt outstanding, and financial distress. Following Baber Financial distress (Deficit) is an indicator variable equal to one for municipalities with operating expenditures greater than total revenues.
Analysis of restatement probabilities
[ Table 2 goes here]
To consider associations between restatements and municipal governance characteristics, we use one observation per municipality, as most municipal governance characteristics are invariant across time. [ Table 3 goes here]
Results for the multivariate specification of restatement probabilities indicated by expression (1) are summarized in Table 3 . The first three columns show estimates for a logit specification where individual governance characteristics are considered; columns 4 through 6 show estimates for the combined measures Audit oversight index and Voter oversight index. We are concerned about correlations between audit and voter oversight characteristics, and therefore, we provide separate specifications in columns 2 and 3 and in columns 5 and 6 where each governance dimension is considered separately along with control variables. To assess the incremental effect of oversight variables, we also show in column 7 a benchmark specification where control variables are included without oversight measures.
Audit oversight measures
Consider the results for audit oversight variables. Notice in Table 3 that the first three audit oversight measures are indicator variables that distinguish municipalities with Big Four auditors, non-Big Four municipal specialists, and state auditors, respectively.
Thus, estimates indicate mean effects of the specified auditor type relative to the benchmark case where the municipality engages a non-Big Four, non-state government auditor that is not a municipal audit specialist (member of the Governmental Audit Quality Center).
As a whole, the auditor classification indicates at least two important points. First, restatement is more likely when state auditors are employed than when independent public accountants are employed. The implication of the result is not straightforward, however. One possibility is that state auditors focus more on operational efficiency -for example, on the disposition of funds provide by the state -than on the veracity of financial information, and therefore, oversight provided by state auditors is substandard on the financial reporting dimension. Another, not necessarily mutually exclusive possibility is that, as part of a related political system, state auditors are less independent, and therefore, provide lower quality financial oversight than independent auditors. We are reluctant to speculate further, as additional investigation is required to justify convincing conclusions. Even so, if the objective is to increase financial reporting quality by discouraging restatements, then these results support the use of independent public accountants.
The second point worth noting is that restatements are less likely when the municipality engages a Big Four auditor or an auditor that specializes in municipal audits. Thus, the analysis does not support the notion that audit committees -at least as audit committees are presently constituted -reduce the probability of financial restatement.
Finally, results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 indicate the consequence of considering audit characteristics in the aggregate. In particular, greater audit oversight corresponds with lower restatement probability (α <0.01, two-tailed).
Voter oversight measures
Four points emerge from studying associations between the voter oversight characteristics and restatements. First, municipalities with staggered councils are more likely to experience restatements. Recall that staggered councils are a proxy for municipal manager entrenchment, to the extent that the provision discourages major change in -i.e., complete and immediate turnover of -the incumbent municipal council.
Second, restatements are less likely in municipalities with both initiative and referendum provisions, features that promote direct voter participation. Third, municipalities that recently experience a recall attempt, which we interpret as an indication of the incentives and ability of voters to intervene in municipal government, are also less likely to experience a financial restatement. Finally, associations between the probability of 8 One explanation for finding no significant relation for either the presence or composition of audit committees is that audit committee formation is voluntary and therefore endogenous to the system. To consider this possibility, we estimate a specification of whether the municipality has an audit committee and include the inverse Mills ratio in specifications with audit committee characteristics (Heckman 1979) . Results (not tabulated) for this procedure are similar to those described above.
financial restatement and the Voter oversight index are negative and statistically significant (α <0.01, two-tailed), both when considered separately (column 6 of Table 3) and when considered with audit oversight (column 4 of Table 3 ). As a whole, the results suggest that entrenched municipal officials -that is, managers in cities where voter intervention is a less credible threat -are more likely to experience restatements.
Associations for control variables
Results in Tables 2 and 3 Finally, we find evidence that restatements are less likely for municipalities organized according to the council-manager model. Such evidence supports the results reported elsewhere that financial reporting quality is greater when the council-manager form is in place (Evans and Patton 1983; 1987; Copley 1991) .
Consequences of Restatements in Municipal Debt Markets

Restatements and debt costs
[ Table 4 goes here] [ Table 5 goes here]
We begin by estimating an OLS specification of TIC minus the prevailing market index. The specification includes an indicator variable set equal to one (zero, otherwise)
to distinguish issues following, from issues preceding, restatements. The estimate on the post-restatement indicator variable, displayed in the first column of Table 5 , indicates a statistically significant (α < 0.01, two-tailed) 35 basis point increase in municipal debt costs after the restatement.
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The specification in the second column includes variables identified in Baber and Gore (2008) to consider factors other than restatements that potentially influence TIC. The Bond Buyer Index is included as an independent variable, and thus, the dependent variable is raw TIC. The estimate on the post-restatement indicator variable indicates mean municipal debt costs are greater by 35 basis points following a restatement (α < 0.01, two-tailed). Thus, both specifications indicate nontrivial adverse consequences to restatements in municipal debt markets. Specifically, hypothesis 1 -that debt financing costs are independent of the restatement event -is rejected in favor of the alternative that municipal debt costs are significantly higher following a restatement.
Analysis using composite audit and voter oversight measures
Given the finding that restatements increase municipal debt costs, the research taxes. These effects are not the focus of the investigation, and therefore, we do not go beyond these speculations.
Analysis using individual audit and voter oversight characteristics
[ Table 6 goes here] Table 5 where governance characteristics are considered using the composite indices. This result confirms nontrivial adverse consequences in municipal debt markets from financial restatements.
Expected signs for the interactions between the governance characteristic and the post-restatement dummy variable are displayed in the first row of the table. These expectations are informed by cross-sectional associations displayed in Table 3 . In particular, with respect to audit oversight variables, we anticipate that engaging a Big Four auditor, a municipal specialist, or maintaining an audit committee mitigates the adverse consequences of accounting restatements. We are uncertain about the implications of using a state auditor or changing the external auditor, however, and therefore offer no predictions about the sign for these associations.
Regarding the voter oversight variables, we presume that staggered election of council members and having neither initiative nor referendum provisions discourages direct voter participation and thus weakens voter oversight. Hence, we expect positive interactions for these characteristics. In contrast, we expect that political competition (council turnover), having both initiative and recall provisions, or experiencing a recall attempt is evidence of strong voter oversight, and therefore, we anticipate negative interactions for these characteristics.
The evidence in Table 6 generally supports the notion that strong audit or voter oversight attenuates the consequences of financial reporting restatements, although support for this expectation is not uniform for all individual characteristics. Regarding the audit oversight variables, we find that municipalities with auditor switches during the 2001 to 2004 period experience more substantial adverse reactions to restatements than municipalities that do not switch auditors. This result raises the possibility that auditor terminations by municipalities that experience restatements are perceived negatively by lenders. These perceptions potentially reflect the circumstances that precipitate auditor terminations or concerns that new auditors are less well informed, and thus provide lower quality municipal audits than do continuing auditors. Unfortunately, the data do not permit a convincing investigation of which explanation applies.
In contrast with the evidence in Table 3 , which does not support the notion that audit committees discourage accounting errors that ultimately manifest as restatements, evidence in Table 6 suggests that municipal audit committees mitigate the adverse consequences of restatements when they occur. In particular, the statistically significant negative estimate on the interaction (Audit committee X post-restatement) indicates that increases in debt costs following restatement disclosures are lower by 39 basis points than increases following restatement disclosures by municipalities that do not have audit committees.
Also in contrast with evidence in Table 3 , which indicates that restatements are less likely for municipalities that engage Big Four auditors or auditors that specialize in municipal engagements, results in Table 6 indicate that the debt market consequences of restatements are independent of external auditor type. That is, estimates on interactions between the post-restatement dummy variable and whether the municipality engages a Big Four auditor, a municipal specialist, or a state auditor are not statistically significant at conventional reliability levels (α < 0.10, two-tailed).
Evidence in Table 6 also indicates the relevance of individual voter oversight measures as determinants of the consequences of restatements in municipal debt markets.
The -0.39 estimate on the interaction between the post-restatement dummy variable and the measure of political competition; the 0.31 estimate on the interaction with the dummy variable that distinguishes municipalities with neither initiative nor referendum provisions; and the -0.33 estimate on the interaction with recent recall attempts are each statistically significant and consistent with expectations. Associations are not statistically significant, however, for interactions between the post-restatement dummy variable and whether the municipality has a staggered council or whether the municipality has both initiative and referendum provisions. As a whole, the evidence in Table 6 supports the associations in Table 5 for the composite audit and voter oversight indices. Thus, the null hypothesis 2 is rejected in favor of the alternative that the adverse debt consequences of restatements are mitigated by audit and voter oversight.
Sensitivity
We use subsamples of the data to consider issues that can bias associations for the primary sample. First, if restatements influence municipal debt costs, then decisions to issue debt are potentially affected. If so, then the sample of municipal debt issues before restatements can differ systematically from the sample of issues after restatements on dimensions not considered by control variables. To address this concern, we estimate specifications for a sample of 342 debt issues for municipalities that issue debt both before and after the restatement. Second, from the analysis of restatement determinants, we suspect that the incidence of, and circumstances that cause, restatements by municipalities that switch auditors may differ from those for municipalities that do not switch auditors. Moreover, auditor switches themselves may influence, or may be influenced by, decisions to seek debt financing. Thus, we estimate the specification for a sub-sample of 261 debt issues for municipalities that engage the same auditor throughout the period encompassed by the study. Results for these sub-samples are similar to those reported in Tables 5 and 6 , although, owing to smaller sample size, some associations are less significant statistically.
Concluding remarks
We investigate the consequences of financial restatements in municipal debt markets, and the role of audit and voter oversight in mitigating or exacerbating these effects. Interest in these issues is motivated by recent concerns about financial reporting quality at both the federal and local government levels, which suggest that governmental restatements undermine public trust and confidence (GAO 2010; Walker 2005) . To our knowledge, the study is the first to consider adverse consequences of financial reporting quality in the municipal government context. Moreover, we provide a more comprehensive treatment of municipal governance than extant literature, in part by constructing indices designed to capture cross-sectional differences in municipal audit and voter characteristics.
The results indicate that municipal debt interest costs are substantially higher following restatement disclosure, which suggests that financial reporting quality is important in municipal bond markets. Moreover, the study has potentially important policy implications regarding audit and voter oversight in the municipal context. We find that restatements are less likely, and that the adverse consequences of restatements in municipal debt markets are less substantial, when audit oversight is strong. These results suggest the importance of the municipal audit function as a component of the municipal oversight process. Policy implications of the investigation of voter oversight are similarly straightforward. The results indicate that restatements are more likely, and the increase in debt financing costs following restatements are more substantial, when municipal managers are entrenched -that is, when the ability of voters to alter the composition of the city council or to intervene directly in the municipal decision-making process is restricted. This result squares with evidence reported for the corporate sector where the likelihood of accounting restatement is greater when the costs to shareholders of direct involvement in corporate decision-making are relatively high (Baber et al. 2009 ).
As a whole, results reported in the study inform thinking about the implications of proposed changes in municipal governance and oversight procedures, such as those involving municipal audit committees (e.g., GFOA 2006). Council-manager is an indicator equal to one for municipalities with the council-manager form of government; Size is mean log of population over the sample period; Debt is the average total debt outstanding divided by total population over the sample period; and Deficit is an indicator equal to one if total revenues less expenses is less than zero in any of the sample years. Recall attempt is an indicator set to one if citizens attempted to recall either the mayor or a council member in the preceding five years; GAAP is an indicator equal to one for states that mandate all municipalities follow GAAP disclosure requirements, else zero; Unregulated is an indicator equal to one for states that do not regulate municipal disclosure requirements, else zero; Council-manager is an indicator equal to one for municipalities with the council-manager form of government; Size is mean log of population over the sample period; Debt is the average total debt outstanding divided by total population over the sample period; and Deficit is an indicator equal to one if total revenues less expenses is less than zero in any of the sample years. Table 5 Entries are OLS estimates for specifications of true interest cost (TIC), computed as the discount rate that equates the present value of the bond principal and interest payments with proceeds. The dependent variable is TIC less the Bond Buyer index of market yields for municipal general obligation or revenue bonds in model 1, and TIC in models 2 through 5. T-statistics, computed using robust standard errors clustered on municipality, are shown parenthetically. For brevity, estimates are not displayed for intercept dummy variables that distinguish municipalities by state.
Independent variables are computed as follows. Post-restatement is an indicator variable set to 1 if the municipal bond is issued within 3 years after the date of restatement, and 0 if issued within 3 years prior to the date of restatement; the Audit oversight index is computed as (Big 4 auditor + Municipal specialist + Audit committee + [1 -Auditor switch]); the Voter oversight index is computed as (Political competition + [1 -Staggered] + Both provisions + Recall attempt); Bond Buyer index of market yields for municipal general obligation or revenue bonds; Competitively bid is a dummy variable set to 1 for sales through a competitive bidding process; GO issue is a dummy variable set to 1 for general obligation issues, and 0 for revenue issues; Bank qualified is a dummy variable set to 1 if the issue qualifies for preferential tax treatment by bank lenders; Call provision is a dummy variable set to 1 if any part of the issue is callable; GFOA certificate is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the municipality is awarded the GFOA certificate; Maturity < 5 years and Maturity > 15 years are dummy variables set to 1 if the number of years until the bond's maturity is less than 5 years or greater than 15 years, respectively; Issue amount is the log of the face value of the issue; Size is the log of population; Population growth is the population change over the preceding five years; and Bond rating indicates Moody's ratings, where Aaa = 1, and the numerical rating increases by 1 as the bond rating declines. Independent variables are computed as follows. Post-restatement is an indicator variable set to 1 if the municipal bond is issued within 3 years after the date of restatement, and 0 if issued within 3 years prior to the date of restatement; Big 4 auditor is an indicator variable equal to one if the municipality's financial statements are audited by one of the largest four audit firms; Municipal specialist is an indicator variable equal to one if the municipality's financial statements are audited by a government audit specialist that is not a member of the Big Four; State auditor is an indicator set to one if the municipality's financial statements are audited by a state government auditor; Auditor switch is an indicator set to one if the municipality switched auditors during [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] ; Audit committee is an indicator equal to one if the municipality has an audit committee; Staggered is an indicator variable equal to one if council elections are staggered; Political competition is an indicator variable equal to one when incumbents running for election are not re-elected to the city council during the 2001-2004 period; Both provisions is an indicator equal to one if the municipality has initiative and referendum provisions, else zero; No provisions is an indicator equal to one if the municipality has neither initiative nor referendum provisions, else zero; and Recall attempt is an indicator set to one if citizens attempted to recall either the mayor or a council member in the preceding five years.
